> I personally use a boot-stub based booting method with my own SB keys
Same here - stub, kernel, initrd and embedded cmdline all in a signed UKI on the ESP. I do encrypt my root however, so I wouldn't go as far as "painless" for the grub->efibootmgr switch (but I also switched initramfs generator so... always keep a rescue stick around).
But it's all about ownership and trust. I control the keys - hence I am the owner of my computer - and I don't trust e.g. Microsoft[1] to not eventually try to fuck me over. But that's not the important part.
> Also, I don't understand where remote attestation entered the conversation here, and I also don't see why that can't be a community based thing (al la let's encrypt is now everyone's CA) where you can choose your providers or even roll it yourself.
Remote attestation is mentioned five times in TFA and is where this can get really pernicious - indirectly limiting user choice because $safety_critical_industry (e.g. banking) only allows "the corporate keys" (likely including a few Linuxes too, but something like Gentoo couldn't be). They'll even have very good and completely valid security reasons for not allowing arbitrary user keys, but they'd lock me down to approved choices remotely. A reverse AGPL if you will.
Of course, workarounds will exist: "just multiboot", "just use multiple devices", "just choose the bank that allows you to whitelist your key" (assuming there is one, it's nice to dream) - but user freedom is reduced without malicious intent being strictly necessary anywhere in the process.
That's focusing on the negatives with my paranoiac hat on, of course.
Same here - stub, kernel, initrd and embedded cmdline all in a signed UKI on the ESP. I do encrypt my root however, so I wouldn't go as far as "painless" for the grub->efibootmgr switch (but I also switched initramfs generator so... always keep a rescue stick around).
But it's all about ownership and trust. I control the keys - hence I am the owner of my computer - and I don't trust e.g. Microsoft[1] to not eventually try to fuck me over. But that's not the important part.
> Also, I don't understand where remote attestation entered the conversation here, and I also don't see why that can't be a community based thing (al la let's encrypt is now everyone's CA) where you can choose your providers or even roll it yourself.
Remote attestation is mentioned five times in TFA and is where this can get really pernicious - indirectly limiting user choice because $safety_critical_industry (e.g. banking) only allows "the corporate keys" (likely including a few Linuxes too, but something like Gentoo couldn't be). They'll even have very good and completely valid security reasons for not allowing arbitrary user keys, but they'd lock me down to approved choices remotely. A reverse AGPL if you will.
Of course, workarounds will exist: "just multiboot", "just use multiple devices", "just choose the bank that allows you to whitelist your key" (assuming there is one, it's nice to dream) - but user freedom is reduced without malicious intent being strictly necessary anywhere in the process.
That's focusing on the negatives with my paranoiac hat on, of course.
[1] https://www.theregister.com/2022/07/07/lennart_poettering_re...